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STOPPING ILLEGAL FISHING AND SEAFOOD 
FRAUDSTERS: THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK 
FORCE’S PLAN ON TACKLING IUU  
FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD 
Abstract: Worldwide seafood markets have a major problem: too often, the sea-
food listed on the menu is of a different species than what is served. This phe-
nomenon—known as seafood fraud—and the related practice of illegal, unre-
ported, and unregulated fishing threatens the sustainability of our oceans, poses 
health risks to consumers, and forces consumers to pay a high price for a cheap 
product. Previous domestic and international efforts to combat this issue have 
failed for a number of reasons, including the international nature of the industry, 
a byzantine supply chain, the large number of entities responsible for combatting 
the issue, the lack of resources provided to those entities, and the difficulty iden-
tifying and differentiating species of seafood. Recent efforts, like an Action Plan 
promulgated by the Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud, show promise of curbing the issue, 
but are nevertheless insufficient. This Note argues for a bilateral agreement be-
tween the United States and European Union that provides for coordinated pro-
grams and enforcement mechanisms. 
INTRODUCTION 
The last time you ate seafood at a restaurant or from the local market, it is 
possible that the species you ordered was not the species you ate.1 Seafood 
fraud is the practice by which buyers are deceived as to the type, quality, or 
amount of seafood they purchase.2 It is estimated that the practice yields a fif-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See EUGENE H. BUCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34124, SEAFOOD MARKETING: COMBAT-
ING FRAUD AND DECEPTION 2 (2008); CHARLES M. DUNCAN, HOW SAFE IS OUR FOOD?: EAT, 
DRINK & BE WARY 61 (2015); BETH LOWELL ET AL., ONE NAME, ONE FISH: WHY SEAFOOD NAMES 
MATTER, OCEANA 2–3 (July 2015); Margaret A. Young, International Trade Law Compatibility of 
Market-Related Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, 69 MARINE 
POL’Y 209, 209 (2016); Mystery Fish: The Label Said Red Snapper, the Lab Said Baloney, CONSUM-
ER REPORTS, Dec. 2011, at 18 [hereinafter Mystery Fish] (discussing studies that show 20–25% of 
global seafood is mislabeled); Nicole Lou, Bait and Switch: The Fraud Crisis in the Seafood Industry, 
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/bait-and-
switch/388126/ [https://perma.cc/KS9M-68BG]. 
 2 See DEP’T OF COM., PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD 
FRAUD: ACTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2014) [herein-
after PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-258, SEAFOOD 
FRAUD: FDA PROGRAM CHANGES AND BETTER COLLABORATION AMONG KEY FEDERAL AGENCIES 
COULD IMPROVE DETECTION AND PREVENTION 1 (2009) [hereinafter GAO-09-258]; LOWELL ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 2–3 (describing seafood fraud as encompassing “any illegal activity that misrepresents 
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teen to forty-eight percent chance that a consumer will receive the wrong fish.3 
Accordingly, there is little doubt among experts that seafood fraud cheats con-
sumers and the industry out of billions of dollars annually.4 
Valued at more than $132 billion, with a yearly volume of more than 160 
million tons, seafood is extremely valuable and highly traded.5 The United States 
imports approximately ninety percent of its seafood at a value of more than 
twenty billion dollars.6 The vast size of the seafood market provides ample op-
portunity for economic gain from illegal, unreported, and unregulated (“IUU”) 
fishing practices and seafood fraud.7 
IUU fishing and seafood fraud cause numerous problems that vary in scope 
and effect.8 The majority of these problems, however, fit into three overarching 
categories.9 First, they inhibit conservation efforts and threaten the ecological 
                                                                                                                           
the seafood you purchase”); Stephen Wagner, Note, When Tuna Still Isn’t Tuna: Federal Food Safety 
Regulatory Regime Continues to Inadequately Address Seafood Fraud, 20 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 
111, 112 (2015). 
 3 LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3 (highlighting studies finding that about one-third of seafood 
is mislabeled); Jenn Abelson & Beth Daley, On the Menu, but Not on Your Plate, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 
23, 2011), http://archive.boston.com/business/articles/2011/10/23/on_the_menu_but_not_on_your_
plate/ [https://perma.cc/VZG5-3RXA] (reporting the results of a commissioned study where “analyses 
by the DNA lab and other scientists showed that 87 of 183 [fish products] were sold with the wrong 
species name—48 percent”). 
 4 See Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing, Nov. 22, 2009, at vii [hereinafter PSMA] (arguing that illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (“IUU”) fishing leads to global losses of billions of dollars annually for the seafood in-
dustry); GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing acceptance within the seafood industry that sea-
food fraud is an issue); Lou, supra note 1 (finding that the widespread nature of seafood fraud leads 
Americans to overpay for seafood by up to $25 billion annually). 
 5 Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Food Outlook: Biannual Report on Global Food Markets, at 
112, U.N. Doc. I5703E/1/05.16 (2016) [hereinafter FAO, Food Outlook Report]; LOWELL ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 2. 
 6 See GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1 (finding that more than eighty percent of fraudulent sea-
food is imported); FAO, Food Outlook Report, supra note 5, at 112 (valuing the 2014 U.S. seafood 
market at $20.3 billion); DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57 (finding that the United States imports 91% of 
seafood consumed in the country); LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2 (finding greater than 90% of 
seafood eaten in the United States is imported). 
 7 See GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1 (finding that financial gain is an underlying motivation for 
seafood fraud); BUCK, supra note 1, at i (finding that “with increased seafood imports and decreased 
monitoring, fraud and deception in seafood marketing is becoming more widespread”); Miguel Costa 
Leal et al., Seafood Traceability: Current Needs, Available Tools, and Biotechnological Challenges 
for Origin Certification, 33 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 331, 331 (2015) (arguing that explosive growth 
in the seafood industry leads to economic challenges). 
 8 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing the environmental and economic 
impacts of seafood fraud); PSMA, supra note 4, at vii (discussing the environmental, economic, and 
food security impacts of IUU fishing); Wagner, supra note 2, at 112 (arguing that seafood fraud has 
negative economic, health, and environmental impacts). 
 9 See GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1 (highlighting the negative economic and health impacts of 
seafood fraud); Danna-Mareè Cawthorn et al., Fish Species Substitution and Misnaming in South 
Africa: An Economic Safety and Sustainability Conundrum Revisited, 185 FOOD CHEMISTRY 165, 165 
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health of worldwide fisheries.10 Second, they engender various health risks for 
individuals consuming mislabeled seafood, including consumption of high levels 
of mercury and various pathogens.11 Third, they have negative economic im-
pacts as they hurt consumers and sellers by distorting the legal seafood trade and 
fueling unfair competition.12 
A variety of factors make it difficult to develop effective domestic and in-
ternational policies and enforcement mechanisms to combat seafood fraud.13 The 
obstacles include the international nature of the industry, a byzantine supply 
chain, the large number of entities responsible for combatting the issue, the lack 
of resources provided to these agencies, and the difficulty identifying and differ-
entiating species of seafood.14 Despite these obstacles, the Presidential Task 
Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud (“Presidential Task 
Force”) published an Action Plan on March 15, 2015 with various recommenda-
tions that hold promise for curbing the problems.15 Nevertheless, additional ac-
tion is needed to further increase the chance that the next time you sit down to a 
seafood dinner, you get what you paid for.16 
                                                                                                                           
(2015) (highlighting the negative environmental and economic impacts); Wagner, supra note 2, at 112 
(highlighting the negative economic, health, and environmental impacts). 
 10 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3; PSMA, supra note 4, at vii. 
 11 See LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4. See generally DUNCAN, supra note 1 (discussing the 
various health risks associated with seafood fraud). 
 12 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3; GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1. 
 13 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8; GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 9; Comm. 
on Fisheries on Its Twenty-Third Session, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Elimi-
nate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, at 1 (June 23, 2001) [hereinafter IPOA]; Cawthorn 
et al., supra note 9, at 180 (finding that various measures to combat IUU seafood fraud, including 
traceability and labeling rules, are unlikely to work “without effective enforcement and appropriately 
discouraging penalisation”); Leal et al., supra note 7, at 332 (finding that the complex nature of the 
seafood supply chain and the international market require a multifaceted approach to combatting sea-
food fraud); Young, supra note 1, at 215 (finding that combatting IUU fishing requires interaction 
between various entities and laws). 
 14 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8 (discussing the difficulties posed by the 
long and complex seafood supply chain); GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 9, 25 (discussing the compli-
cations posed by the large number of entities involved in combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud); 
DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing the difficulty in addressing seafood fraud due to the lack of 
resources provided to relevant agencies); LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 7 (finding that because “56 
different species of fish can be sold under the acceptable market name of ‘snapper,’ . . . seafood buy-
ers have difficulty differentiating . . . without the use of species-specific names”); Lou, supra note 1 
(finding that the seafood industry suffers the lack of ability to identify seafood quickly). 
 15 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3; KIMBERLY WARNER ET AL., OCEANA 
REVEALS SHORTFALLS IN PROPOSED TRACEABILITY RULE TO ADDRESS SEAFOOD FRAUD 2 (2016) 
(finding that the Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud’s recommenda-
tion to create a traceability system is a good first step toward combatting IUU fishing and seafood 
fraud). 
 16 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3. The Presidential Task Force recommenda-
tion is split into four parts: 
(1) combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud at the international level; (2) strengthen-
ing enforcement and enhancing enforcement tools; (3) creating and expanding partner-
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Part I of this Note defines IUU fishing and seafood fraud, highlights the 
dangers posed by the practices, and discusses the barriers to combatting them.17 
Part II provides an overview of international and domestic efforts to combat the 
issue, including the Presidential Task Force’s recent Action Plan.18 Part III iden-
tifies the most promising methods of combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud, 
highlights the need for an international solution, and discusses the deficits of the 
Presidential Task Force’s Action Plan.19 Part III also argues that the best way to 
combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud in the United States is to coordinate poli-
cies and enter into an agreement with the European Union (EU).20 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD 
A. What Are IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud? 
IUU fishing refers to any fishing performed contrary to relevant domestic 
and international laws, any unreported or misreported fishing as required by do-
mestic and international law, and any fishing activities performed in areas where 
there is not applicable domestic or international law.21 In addition, IUU fishing 
encompasses fishing conducted by vessels without a nationality or flying the flag 
of a country that is not a signatory to a Regional Fishery Management Organiza-
tion (“RFMO”).22 
“Seafood fraud” refers to a variety of deceptive practices that generally in-
clude the “substitution, misrepresentation, or mislabeling” of seafood.23 Alt-
hough there are many forms of seafood fraud, four of them are most prevalent.24 
The first is “species substitution,” which occurs when one species of seafood is 
labeled as a different species.25 The second is “over-treating,” which occurs 
when fishermen or sellers artificially color seafood to feign better quality meat 
or inject seafood with water to increase weight.26 The third is “transshipping,” 
which occurs when seafood is shipped through another country in order to evade 
                                                                                                                           
ships with non-federal entities to identify and eliminate seafood fraud and the sale of 
IUU seafood products in U.S. commerce; and (4) increasing information available on 
seafood products through additional traceability requirements. 
Id. 
 17 See infra notes 21–88 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 89–166 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 167–225 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 167–225 and accompanying text. 
 21 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 4–5; Young, supra note 1, at 209. 
 22 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 4. 
 23 Id. at 5; see LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 1 (defining seafood fraud as “any illegal activity 
that misrepresents the seafood you purchase”); Wagner, supra note 2, at 112. 
 24 GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; BUCK, supra note 1, at i, 5–8. 
 25 GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; BUCK, supra note 1, at 3. 
 26 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5; GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; BUCK, supra 
note 1, at 6–7. 
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customs requirements.27 The final method is “short-weighting,” which occurs 
when a processor packages less weight than a label indicates.28 These practices 
occur at various points along the supply chain—from the collection of seafood to 
final sale.29 
While IUU fishing and seafood fraud are different practices, they overlap in 
certain respects.30 For example, the mislabeling or substitution of species in sea-
food fraud may be employed to hide IUU fishing practices, like fishing for 
threatened species.31 Therefore, while international and federal policies leading 
up to the Presidential Task Force did not explicitly name seafood fraud as a tar-
get, the efforts play an important role in combatting it. 32 
B. What Are the Effects of IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud? 
IUU fishing and seafood fraud have far-reaching and varied consequenc-
es.33 Most importantly, they have negative health, environmental, and economic 
effects.34 First, IUU fishing and seafood fraud pose significant health risks to end 
                                                                                                                           
 27 GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; BUCK, supra note 1, at 8. 
 28 GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; BUCK, supra note 1, at 6. 
 29 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5; GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1. 
 30 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5; Young, supra note 1, at 209. 
 31 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5. 
 32 See, e.g., The Magnuson-Stevens Fisher Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801–1891d (2012) (addressing IUU fishing while omitting specific language regarding “seafood 
fraud”); Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–81, 
§§ 101–305, 129 Stat. 649 (same); Council Regulation 1379/2013, 2013 O.J. (L354) 1, 1–21 (EU) 
(omitting specific “seafood fraud” language); PSMA, supra note 4, at i–32 (addressing IUU fishing 
while omitting specific language regarding “seafood fraud”); United Nations Agreement for the Im-
plementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Decem-
ber 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Fish Stocks, 8 Sept., 1995, 2176 U.N.T.S. 88, 88–137 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement] 
(same); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 397–
581 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (same); Comm’n for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Res., 
Conservation Measure 10-05, Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp., (2014) (no longer 
in force) [hereinafter CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme] (same); PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, 
supra note 2, at 1, 6 (addressing both IUU fishing and seafood fraud); IPOA, supra note 13, at i–24 
(addressing IUU fishing while omitting specific language regarding “seafood fraud”). 
 33 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5; GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; LOWELL ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 2. Seafood is often processed at sea. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 
8; LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. Seafood is cut or ground, packaged, and frozen before crossing 
borders where it is often subject to tariffs and sold. See Lou, supra note 1 (“[L]ess than 1 percent of 
imported seafood is inspected for mislabeling. This is not for lack of trying. . . . NOAA has fewer than 
100 agents who do inspections.”). 
 34 See GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1 (arguing that seafood fraud has negative health and envi-
ronmental effects); Young, supra note 1, at 209 (highlighting the various negative effects of IUU 
fishing, including environmental, economic, and health impacts); Mystery Fish, supra note 1, at 18 
(finding seafood fraud negatively impacts consumers when they are charged more for a cheaper spe-
cies, when they eat a species that negatively impacts their health, and when they unknowingly pur-
chase a protected species). 
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consumers.35 For example, a consumer that unknowingly eats a substituted spe-
cies may consume a greater quantity of a harmful substance, such as mercury.36 
This is particularly concerning for pregnant women and young children because 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommends the consumption of cer-
tain species of fish for their associated health benefits.37 At the same time, the 
FDA recommends the avoidance of certain seafood species due to their health 
risks.38 In addition, some species contain toxic elements and higher risks for 
food-borne illnesses.39 Finally, consumers may eat farm-raised species treated 
with antibiotics, thereby generating antibiotic resistant bacteria at a higher level 
and, in turn, increasing the likelihood of certain infections.40 
Second, IUU fishing and seafood fraud have negative economic conse-
quences.41 Those economically impacted include end consumers, the govern-
ment, and various participants in the seafood industry.42 For consumers, the neg-
ative economic consequences are most pronounced when they pay more for a 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57 (arguing that decreased inspections coupled with increased 
seafood consumption leads to greater health risks); Mystery Fish, supra note 1, at 18 (finding that 
seafood fraud poses various health risks to consumers); Press Release, New Traceability Rule Doesn’t 
Go Far Enough to Stop Seafood Fraud in U.S., OCEANA (June 7, 2016), http://oceana.org/press-
center/press-releases/new-traceability-rule-doesn%E2%80%99t-go-far-enough-stop-seafood-fraud-us 
[https://perma.cc/YN8T-2YW6] [hereinafter Oceana June 7 Press Release] (discussing one study 
where 180 mislabeled seafood species were tested and 62% posed health risks). 
 36 LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4; Mystery Fish, supra note 1, at 18. 
 37 See LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4 (finding that seafood fraud places pregnant women at 
risk of unknowingly consuming seafood with high mercury levels); 2017 EPA-FDA Advice About 
Eating Fish and Shellfish, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/fish-tech/2017-epa-fda-
advice-about-eating-fish-and-shellfish [https://perma.cc/UV2Y-54YJ] (last updated June 27, 2017) 
[hereinafter EPA Guidance] (finding that certain species of fish and shellfish contain levels of mercu-
ry that pose risks to pregnant women and young children). For example, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) recommends pregnant women eat “Spanish mackerel” for its health benefits but avoid 
“king mackerel” due to its high mercury content. Id. These species, however, are easily confused. 
LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 38 See LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4; EPA Guidance, supra note 37. 
 39 See GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing a 2007 case where puffer fish, which is poi-
sonous and potentially deadly, was incorrectly labeled as monkfish, causing consumers to become ill); 
LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 4–5; Lou, supra note 1. In one study, 84% “of white tuna samples 
were actually escolar—a fish that causes digestive problems—in disguise.” Lou, supra note 1. 
 40 DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 60; LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 6. For example, shrimp, which 
is the most consumed seafood by volume in the United States, is frequently sold without delineating 
whether it is farm-raised or wild-caught. LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 6. Farm-raised shrimp are 
treated with antibiotics banned in the United States and contain significantly higher instances of harm-
ful bacteria known to “cause food-borne illness, or even fatalities, including vibrio, e-coli and even 
MRSA, an antibiotic-resistant form of staphylococcus bacteria.” Id. 
 41 GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; Young, supra note 1, at 209; Lou, supra note 1; Mystery Fish, 
supra note 1, at 18. 
 42 GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; Young, supra note 1, at 209; Lou, supra note 1; Mystery Fish, 
supra note 1, at 18, 22. 
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less expensive fish.43 Catfish substituted for grouper, for example, can cost up to 
four times the actual price.44 Substitution also prevents the U.S. government 
from collecting valuable tariffs on certain species.45 Moreover, the practice dis-
torts the market and allows offenders to engage in unfair competition.46 Going 
forward, increased incidence of seafood fraud could negatively affect consumer 
confidence and ultimately diminish seafood consumption.47 In total, the econom-
ic effect is potentially so great that the Presidential Task Force believes IUU fish-
ing endangers economic stability and could lead to international conflict.48 
Lastly, IUU fishing and seafood fraud present significant threats to the en-
vironmental sustainability of fisheries.49 The practices inhibit environmentally 
focused regulatory efforts to manage fisheries responsibly.50 In addition, some 
argue that individuals engaged in IUU fishing are more likely to ignore marine 
environmental protection measures, leading to further environmental risk.51 As a 
result, the mislabeling and substitution of endangered species for abundant spe-
cies has the potential to desolate fish stocks and hurt the greater marine envi-
ronment.52 
C. What Makes Preventing IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud So Difficult? 
A variety of factors complicate efforts to combat IUU fishing and seafood 
fraud.53 First, a small number of inspectors are responsible for the massive vol-
ume of seafood imported to the United States, resulting in an inability to effec-
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Lou, supra note 1 (finding that, among the various actors negatively affected by seafood 
fraud, consumers are particularly affected by seafood fraud because of the inflated prices they pay for 
seafood). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Lou, supra note 1; Mystery Fish, supra note 1, at 22. In one such case, an individual mislabeled 
Asian catfish as grouper and saved over $60 million in tariffs. Mystery Fish, supra note 1, at 22 
 46 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3; Young, supra note 1, at 209. 
 47 See BUCK, supra note 1, at 1 (finding that increases in occurrences of seafood fraud could nega-
tively impact consumer confidence and ultimately decrease seafood consumption in the United States); 
Lou, supra note 1 (finding that the widespread nature of seafood fraud costs U.S. consumers $25 bil-
lion annually). 
 48 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5. 
 49 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPROVING INTERNA-
TIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 9 (2015) [hereinafter NOAA 2015 REPORT]; PRESIDENTIAL TASK 
FORCE, supra note 2, at 3 (finding that IUU fishing and seafood fraud threaten the sustainability of 
global fisheries and have negative effects on the marine environment); Oceana Press Release, supra 
note 35 (discussing one study where 20% of “180 seafood species identified as imposters . . . face the 
threat of extinction”); Young, supra note 1, at 209 (arguing that IUU fishing plays a major role in 
global overfishing and hinders current policies designed to make fisheries more environmentally sus-
tainable). 
 50 NOAA 2015 REPORT, supra note 49, at 9; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 4. 
 51 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5. 
 52 Lou, supra note 1. 
 53 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8. 
1636 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1629 
tively identify and punish IUU fishing and seafood fraud.54 In addition, IUU 
fishing and seafood fraud are difficult to identify, track, and quantify.55 Beyond 
these inherent difficulties, five fundamental issues are worth noting: the interna-
tional nature of the trade, a byzantine seafood supply chain, the large number of 
entities responsible for combatting the issue, the lack of resources provided to 
these agencies, and the difficulty in properly identifying seafood.56 The Presi-
dential Task Force’s recent Action Plan accounts for these many issues, but its 
success depends on international cooperation and its applicability to all steps in 
the supply chain.57 
1. International Nature 
The first difficulty in addressing IUU fishing and seafood fraud is the fact 
that such practices often occur in the international realm.58 The United States 
imports approximately ninety percent of its seafood from all parts of the globe, 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See FAO, Food Outlook Report, supra note 5, at 112 (the United States imported more than 
$18 billion worth of seafood products in 2014); DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing that each 
FDA inspector is technically responsible for physically inspecting fifty-six million pounds of seafood 
annually); BUCK, supra note 1, at i (arguing that instances of seafood fraud are on the rise due to the 
combination of growing imports and less monitoring). 
 55 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5; GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1, 9. 
 56 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8; GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 25; LOWELL 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 7 (finding that because “56 different species of fish can be sold under the 
acceptable market name of ‘snapper,’ . . . seafood buyers have difficulty differentiating . . . without 
the use of species-specific names”); Lou, supra note 1 (finding that the seafood industry is in need of 
faster species identification methods and tools). 
 57 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3–5; see WARNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 18 
(finding that “the proposed rule [does not] require information to be available to consumers about the 
species–specific identity of seafood”); Leal et al., supra note 7, at 333 (arguing that the “implementa-
tion [of the Task Force’s traceability program] is still facing challenges”); Michael Conathan & Avery 
Siciliano, The Future of Seafood Security: The Fight Against Illegal Fishing and Seafood Fraud, CTR. 
AM. PROGRESS (June 8, 2016, 9:02 AM), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2016/
06/06/139004/the-fuure-of-seafood-security-the-fight-against-illegal-fishing-and-seafood-fraud/ 
[https://perma.cc/P7ZN-QNTH] (finding that despite helpful steps to increase transparency and en-
forcement, the United States needs to do more to protect the future of the seafood supply and seafood 
industry). 
 58 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8 (finding that despite a variety of interna-
tional efforts, preventing IUU fishing in international waters is a complicated task); LOWELL ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 2–3 (“The path that seafood travels from its source to the consumer is long, geograph-
ically disparate and multi-tiered. . . . Because seafood fraud has been identified throughout the supply 
chain, simply targeting any particular link would have a limited impact.”); David Fagundes, Crystals 
in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 149 (2009) (discussing the legal complexities of interna-
tional waters); Abelson & Daley, supra note 3 (finding that an increase in consumption of foreign 
seafood has been accompanied by an increase in mislabeling); Conathan & Siciliano, supra note 57 
(finding that identifying seafood fraud within “U.S. borders is one thing, but when the supply chain 
expands overseas, it becomes exponentially more difficult”). 
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making its seafood trade international in nature.59 The majority of seafood fraud 
in the United States occurs with this seafood imported from other countries.60 
The international nature of seafood fraud complicates U.S. efforts to com-
bat it for a variety of reasons.61 For example, U.S. policies cannot exist in a vac-
uum because they need to address loose regulations in the countries where the 
overwhelming majority of seafood originates.62 In addition, any U.S. regulatory 
efforts need to comply with protectionist measures in international trade law.63 
2. Complicated Supply Chain 
The ninety percent of seafood originating in foreign countries often follows 
a byzantine supply chain to the United States.64 The supply chain complicates 
efforts to combat seafood fraud due to its length and the processing measures 
taken along the way.65 First, because seafood passes through various entities on 
its way from the ocean to the plate, and is often not labeled with its country of 
origin, species substitution and mislabeling are extremely difficult to identify.66 
                                                                                                                           
 59 GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57; LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 2. 
 60 See Abelson & Daley, supra note 3 (finding that an increase in consumption of foreign seafood 
has been accompanied by an increase in mislabeling); Lou, supra note 1 (suggesting domestic fisher-
ies largely follow labeling rules). The Presidential Task Force Action Plan notes that “domestic fish-
ery activities are of less concern relative to seafood fraud . . . . Domestic fish and fishery products 
harvested under a federal fisheries management plan have low incidences of species substitution.” 
Presidential Task Force, supra note 2, at 7. 
 61 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3. 
 62 See id.; Anastasia Teletsky, Symposium, Scuttling IUU Fishing and Rewarding Sustainable 
Fishing: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Port State Measures Agreement with Trade Related 
Measures, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1237, 1240 (2015) (finding many vessels register in nations with 
either ineffective or unenforced fisheries policies); Young, supra note 1, at 212 (arguing that combat-
ing IUU fishing is complicated by the fact that vessels often operate in international waters); Lou, 
supra note 1 (finding efforts to combat seafood fraud are hindered by the fact that “ninety percent of 
our fish is imported from countries with loose aquaculture laws, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Canada, 
China, Ecuador, and Vietnam”). 
 63 See Young, supra note 1, at 212 (finding many measures to combat seafood fraud may be com-
plicated various international trade agreements). 
 64 LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2; Mystery Fish, supra note 1, at 19. 
 65 LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2; (discussing the various processes that make it difficult to 
identify species of seafood); Mystery Fish, supra note 1, at 19 (describing the supply chain and pro-
cessing measures, including freezing, moving catch between vessels, and mixing species); Abelson & 
Daley, supra note 3 (finding that “because the sea-to-plate process has become so long and complicat-
ed, there are more opportunities for fraud and mistakes to take place”). 
 66 DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 61 (finding that the vast majority of imported seafood does not have 
a label identifying its country of origin); BUCK, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing the various points along 
the supply chain where seafood fraud can occur); Abelson & Daley, supra note 3 (finding that a varie-
ty of individuals along the seafood supply chain can be responsible for seafood fraud); James Wright, 
Law and Order: As Seafood Fraud Again Makes Headlines, Enforcement Efforts Finally Seem to Be 
Ramping Up, SEAFOOD BUS. MAG., Mar. 2012, at 86 (suggesting that “alteration of the species, pro-
duction method, or country of origin on seafood packaging labels can happen at any point of the sup-
ply chain, from the producer to the importer to the restaurant that prepares it”). 
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Second, fishermen increasingly process and package their catch at sea, ultimate-
ly making it difficult for buyers and regulators to properly identify species.67 
3. Multiple Entities Charged with Combatting Seafood Fraud 
The large number of entities promulgating and enforcing rules further in-
hibit efforts to combat seafood fraud and IUU fishing.68 In the United States, 
three government agencies are primarily responsible for identifying and deter-
ring seafood fraud: the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA), and the FDA.69 In reality, though, there are 
many other agencies involved.70 Moreover, portions of the seafood fraud chain 
fall outside of the federal government’s jurisdiction, requiring further coordina-
tion with state and local entities.71 Finally, governments rely on non-
governmental organizations and private industry to combat seafood fraud.72 Giv-
en the number and variety of actors involved, coordination of policy is critical to 
successfully eradicating seafood fraud.73 Coordination in such an environment is 
difficult, however, and has failed thus far.74 
                                                                                                                           
 67 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8; LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2; Mystery 
Fish, supra note 1, at 19. 
 68 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 1, 3 (discussing the complications that arise 
from the large number of U.S. entities responsible for combatting seafood fraud); GAO-09-258, supra 
note 2, at 2 (discussing the various U.S. entities responsible for combatting seafood fraud); Young, 
supra note 1, at 212 (arguing that measures to combat the issue are carried out by both governmental 
and non-governmental entities). 
 69 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3, 8; GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 2. The Govern-
ment Accountability Office report refers to the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) instead of 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”). GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 2. 
NMFS is an office within NOAA, often referred to as “NOAA Fisheries.” About Us, NOAA FISHERIES, 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aboutus/aboutus.html [https://perma.cc/75LT-646C]. The Presidential Task 
Force membership consists of eleven separate entities across the federal government and states “the full 
scope of agency expertise, capacity, and authorities reflected in the Task Force membership are vital to 
the success of this effort.” Id. 
 70 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 1, 3. 
 71 See id. at 5, 9 (finding “cooperation with state and local authorities on addressing seafood fraud 
is essential” because many parts of the supply chain are “intrastate, or at the local level, and are some-
times outside federal jurisdiction”); Mystery Fish, supra note 1, at 19 (arguing that the FDA believes 
the responsibility to combat IUU fishing falls largely to states and local entities). 
 72 See GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 11 (finding private entities within the seafood industry also 
contribute in efforts to identify and stop seafood fraud); NOAA 2015 REPORT, supra note 50, at 14 
(discussing the vital importance of public-private partnerships); Young, supra note 1, at 212 (arguing 
that measures to combat the issue are effected by both government and non-government entities). 
 73 See GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 3. In its report to the Senate, the Government Accountability 
Office highlighted the fact that “when agencies do not collaborate efficiently and effectively, their 
individual efforts are carried out in an uncoordinated way, thereby limiting overall effectiveness and 
efficiency.” Id. 
 74 See id. at 6 (“The federal agencies that share responsibility for detecting and preventing sea-
food fraud . . . do not efficiently and effectively collaborate with each other.”). 
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4. Lack of Resources 
Regulatory entities do not have the resources needed to regulate and en-
force policies that combat seafood fraud.75 In particular, a lack of funding pre-
vents agencies from successfully carrying out their mandates.76 Due in part to a 
lack of funding, only eighty-five to ninety-two FDA inspectors are responsible 
for inspecting seafood.77 One estimate suggests that each inspector would need 
to physically check fifty-six million pounds of seafood.78 Unsurprisingly, less 
than two percent of imported seafood is actually inspected.79 
5. Identifying Seafood 
Combatting seafood fraud requires the ability to properly identify species.80 
Unfortunately, current technology and industry practices make proper identifica-
tion difficult for both experts and consumers.81 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing is typically required to properly identify species, but often takes more 
than twelve hours to produce a definitive result.82 Given the vast amount of sea-
food presented for inspection, DNA testing is an impractical method for detect-
ing seafood fraud.83 
Processing and species-naming practices further hinder efforts to identify 
seafood.84 For example, at-sea processing practices like filleting and freezing 
remove many of a species identifying features.85 In addition, regulations allow a 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id. at 5–6; Food Safety: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 9 
(2007) (statement of Thomas Stenzel, President and CEO, United Fresh Produce Association) [herein-
after Stenzel Testimony] (arguing that a “lack of proper funding means fewer inspectors, resulting in 
the federally mandated responsibilities being bypassed”); DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57–58 (discussing 
the complications posed by insufficient funding); Abelson & Daley, supra note 3 (arguing that the 
lack of testing to identify species is responsible for the widespread nature of seafood fraud). 
 76 See Stenzel Testimony, supra note 75, at 9; BUCK, supra note 1, 9–10; DUNCAN, supra note 1, 
at 58; Lou, supra note 1. 
 77 BUCK, supra note 1, 9–10; DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57. 
 78 DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 58. 
 79 GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 5; DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57; Lou, supra note 1. 
 80 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8; LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
 81 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8; LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
 82 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8; BUCK, supra note 1, at 2 (finding that the 
identification of species often requires DNA testing); Abelson & Daley, supra note 3 (finding that 
consumers frequently are unable to identify seafood species). 
 83 See Abelson & Daley, supra note 3 (finding even high-end chefs have difficulty identifying 
seafood once it has been filleted); Lou, supra note 1. 
 84 See LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2; Leal et al., supra note 7, at 332; Teletsky, supra note 
62, at 1242. 
 85 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 8 (finding that “over half of the world’s fish 
production is processed at sea or soon after landing, which in many cases renders the species unidenti-
fiable without forensic laboratory analysis”); Abelson & Daley, supra note 3 (finding seafood fraud 
can occur at processing facilities where fish are filleted, rendering them indistinguishable from various 
other species). Processing of seafood at sea includes many practices, including the transformation of 
1640 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1629 
variety of species to be sold under certain common names, making it difficult for 
consumers to know what they are eating.86 To address these difficulties, some 
argue that requiring “species-specific” names is a crucial step toward combatting 
seafood fraud and educating consumers.87 In combination, the widespread and 
varied nature of all of the aforementioned barriers to combatting IUU fishing and 
seafood fraud lead to the conclusion that any efforts to stop these practices need 
to be multifaceted.88 
II. LEGAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD 
The United Nations (UN), RFMOs, EU, and United States combat IUU 
fishing and seafood fraud through a variety of treaties and legislation designed 
to identify and punish those engaged in these practices.89 These various efforts 
call for the collection and tracking of data, various modes of enforcement, 
support and training for developing countries, and coordination among domes-
tic and international entities.90 Two recent trends show particular promise in the 
fight against IUU fishing and seafood fraud.91 
First, newer measures increasingly devise and implement traceability pro-
grams, which are “market-related measures” that seek to follow seafood from its 
initial removal from the ocean to its entry point into the market.92 Second, newer 
                                                                                                                           
“fish to fillet [and] shrimp to cocktail,” which ultimately “obscures the true identity of many types of 
seafood.” LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
 86 LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3, 6; see Wright, supra note 68, at 28 (recognizing highly 
excessive use of common species names). For instance, it is legal in the United States to sell at least 
fifty-six distinct species as “snapper.” LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3, 6. 
 87 LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3, 6. 
 88 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3; Leal et al., supra note 7, at 332. 
 89 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5) (2012); Pub. L. No. 114–81, §§ 101–305, 129 Stat. 649; 
Council Regulation 1224/2009, 2009 O.J. (L343) 1 (EU) (addressing IUU fishing while omitting 
specific language regarding “seafood fraud”); Council Regulation 1005/2008, 2008 O.J. (L286) 1, 1 
(EU) (same); PSMA, supra note 4, at vii; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Nov. 24, 1993, 2221 U.N.T.S. 120, 120 [hereinafter 1993 FAO 
Compliance Agreement]; 50 C.F.R. §§ 300.323–.325, 600.725 (2016); CCAMLR Catch Documenta-
tion Scheme, supra note 32, at 1. 
 90 See Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 2–4; Council Regulation 1005/2008, 
supra note 89, at 1–5 (calling on EU member states to cooperate and develop regulations targeting the 
variety of factors that enable IUU fishing); PSMA, supra note 4, at vii–viii, 1–2, 9, 12–14, 16; Fish 
Stocks Agreement, supra note 32, at 88, 100, 103, 119; 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, supra 
note 89, at 120, 126 (calling for coordination amongst member states, data collection, and support to 
developing nations); UNCLOS, supra note 32, at 421, 423 (calling for collaboration and support for 
developing nations). 
 91 See Young, supra note 1, at 210. 
 92 See Council Regulation 1379/2013, supra note 32, at 5, 11–12; PSMA, supra note 4, at 1; 
CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme, supra note 32, at 3; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra 
note 2, at 36; Teletsky, supra note 62, at 1262; Young, supra note 1, at 209–10 (finding that modern 
efforts to inhibit IUU fishing with market-related measures rely on data that tracks seafood from its 
source). 
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policies set up systems for identifying and tracking both countries and specific 
vessels engaged in IUU fishing and provide means for enforcing policies against 
offenders through various “port state measures,” including blocking those sus-
pected of engaging in IUU fishing from accessing ports.93 The Presidential Task 
Force’s Action Plan encompasses these measures, but more work needs to be 
done to ensure their success.94 
A. International Efforts to Combat IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud 
1. UN Efforts to Combat IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud 
Four UN treaties lay the foundation for efforts to combat IUU fishing and 
seafood fraud: the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”); the 
1993 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels Fishing on the High Seas (“1993 FAO Compliance Agree-
ment”); the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conser-
vation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks (“UN Fish Stocks Agreement”); and the 2009 Agreement on Port State 
Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate IUU Fishing (“PSMA”).95 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 43; PSMA, supra note 4, at 1; Teletsky, 
supra note 62, at 1243–44 (highlighting modern efforts to combat IUU fishing, including the “primary 
strategy” of using port state measures); Young, supra note 1, at 209 (finding that modern efforts to 
inhibit IUU fishing with market-related measures rely on data that enables the identification of nations 
engaged in the practice and the ability to take action against vessels from those nations). In addition, 
countries are increasingly using “port state measures,” in which those engaged in IUU fishing are 
denied access to ports of countries participating in a given IUU measure. Young, supra note 1, at 209. 
Specifically, port state measures refer to various requirements that one nation may impose on vessels 
from another nation before those vessels gain access to ports. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.: 
FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T, Port State Measures: What Are Port State Measures?, 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/en [https://perma.cc/HV9F-ZV45]. Such measures might include 
notice of entry requirements, restrictions on which ports a vessel may use, restrictions of sale of sea-
food, and inspection requirements. Id. 
 94 WARNER, supra note 15, at 18 (highlighting specific shortcomings of the traceability program, 
including the fact that it does not require sellers to identify seafood to consumers by its species-
specific name); Leal et al., supra note 7, at 333 (finding that the traceability program established by 
the Task Force has shortcomings); Conathan & Siciliano, supra note 57 (finding that the Presidential 
Task Force’s efforts are a good start, but also concluding that more work needs to be done to protect 
the global seafood industry); Oceana June 7 Press Release, supra note 35 (arguing that “the proposed 
rule does not increase transparency for the majority of seafood sold in the United States”). 
 95 See generally PSMA, supra note 4 (creating a binding international agreement to enhance port 
state measures that target IUU fishing and seafood fraud); Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 32 
(calling on signatories to cooperate in order to ensure more sustainable fishing practices and to target 
those engaged in IUU fishing); 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, supra note 89 (calling on signato-
ries to cooperate and exchange information in order uphold various conservation and fisheries com-
mitments); UNCLOS, supra note 32 (establishing a “legal order for the seas and oceans”). 
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The UN’s recent efforts to combat IUU fishing are grounded in the UN-
CLOS.96 While the UNCLOS does not address IUU fishing directly, it sets out 
the “basic duty of countries to cooperate in the conservation and management 
of shared fisheries resources.”97 Specifically, the UNCLOS calls on states to 
collect and share statistics on fishing yields and conservation measures from 
fishing activities within their own “exclusive economic zone.”98 It also calls 
for similar measures on the “high seas,” requiring signatories to collect the 
same data required in the exclusive economic zone and to regularly share it 
with international organizations.99 
Another major UN initiative related to IUU fishing is the 1993 FAO 
Compliance Agreement.100 The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement expands 
upon the UNCLOS requirements for nations to coordinate practices and act in 
accordance with the UNCLOS’s conservation efforts.101 In particular, the 1993 
FAO Compliance Agreement focuses on efforts to track and punish fishing 
vessels flouting measures to protect marine life.102 In order to do so, the 
agreement requires signatories to collect, track, and share information on ves-
sels flying their flag.103 The information required includes the vessel’s name, 
registration information, size, and utilized fishing practices.104 
In 1995, the UN adopted the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, thereby reaf-
firming and expanding upon the efforts set out in UNCLOS and the 1993 FAO 
Compliance Agreement.105 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement reiterated a number 
                                                                                                                           
 96 PSMA, supra note 4, at 2; Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 32, at 88; 1993 FAO Compli-
ance Agreement, supra note 89, at 120. 
 97 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 6; see UNCLOS, supra note 32, at 421, 441. 
 98 UNCLOS, supra note 32, at 418, 421. The UNCLOS defines the “exclusive economic zone” as 
“an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in 
this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of 
other States are government by the relevant provisions of this Convention.” Id. at 418. 
 99 See id. at 442. 
 100 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, supra note 89, at 120. 
 101 See id.; UNCLOS, supra note 32, at 442; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 6. 
 102 See 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, supra note 89. The preamble to the agreement 
acknowledges that vessels take various steps to flout regulations, and the failure to enforce those regu-
lations plays a significant role in preventing their success. Id. at pmbl. Article V calls on signatories to 
work together by sharing data on various vessels engaged in IUU fishing activities. Id. at 124. 
 103 See id. Specifically, Article IV requires parties to “maintain a record of fishing vessels entitled 
to fly its flag and authorized to be used for fishing on the high seas, and shall take such measures as 
may be necessary to ensure that all such fishing vessels are entered in that record.” Id. Moreover, 
Article VI calls on parties to “make readily available to [Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (“FAO”)] the following information with respect to each fishing vessel entered in the 
record required to be maintained under Article IV.” Id. 
 104 Id. at 124–25. 
 105 See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 32, at 88; 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, supra 
note 89, at 120; UNCLOS, supra note 32, at 442; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 6 
(noting that the Fish Stocks Agreement specifies the requirements countries must take to control ves-
sels flying their flag and make sure they do not flout regulations). 
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of the principles in the previous agreements, including a call for parties to con-
tinue collecting, sharing, and streamlining data on fish stocks to ensure pro-
gress on conservation goals.106 Importantly, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
also provides that port states should take legal measures to ensure compliance 
with various requirements.107 
Building upon the aforementioned efforts, the PSMA created the first set 
of mandatory criteria precisely targeting IUU fishing.108 In particular, the 
PSMA sought to create baseline criteria for nations to use when deciding 
whether to allow a vessel into a given port.109 These minimum criteria include 
specific steps to ensure a given ship does not catch seafood illegally.110 These 
efforts prevent seafood obtained through IUU fishing from getting to markets, 
thus diminishing incentives to fish illegally.111 In addition, the PSMA calls for 
the training of inspectors to ensure compliance with the various provisions of 
the agreement.112 In sum, the PSMA combines many of the efforts and provi-
sions of the previous UN agreements, targeting IUU fishing in a single, legally 
binding treaty.113 These various treaties are the foundation for the recent trend 
toward traceability and port state measures.114 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 32, at 100, 103; 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, 
supra note 89, at 124; UNCLOS, supra note 32, at 442. Specifically, Article 14 provides “vessels 
flying [a party’s] flag [shall] provide such information as may be necessary in order to fulfill their 
obligations under [the] Agreement.” See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 32, at 124. In addition, 
Article 14 requires parties to “cooperate, either directly or through subregional or regional fisheries 
management organizations or arrangements . . . to agree on the specification of data and the format in 
which they are to be provided to such organizations or arrangements.” Id. at 103–04. 
 107 See id. at 118–19. 
 108 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 6. See generally PSMA, supra note 4. While the 
PSMA is the first UN treaty to specifically target IUU fishing, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing (“IPOA”) was an earlier UN effort specifically aimed at IUU fishing. See 
IPOA, supra note 13, at 1. See generally PSMA, supra note 4. Among other provisions, the IPOA 
specifically calls for tracking seafood from its initial harvesting to the final point of sale. IPOA, supra 
note 13, at 7. 
 109 PSMA, supra note 4, at vii. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 13. Article 17 provides that “[e]ach Party shall ensure that its inspectors are properly 
trained taking into account the guidelines for the training of inspectors in Annex E. Parties shall seek 
to cooperate in this regard.” Id. 
 113 See id. at 2. 
 114 See Pub. L. No. 114–81, § 302, 129 Stat. at 664; Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 
89, at 1; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 6. 
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2. Regional Efforts to Combat IUU Fishing 
The various UN agreements call on nations to organize RFMOs to combat 
IUU fishing.115 These regional groups create mandatory international standards 
designed to combat IUU fishing.116 The measures taken are similar to those 
under UN agreements, including mandates for reporting, vessel monitoring, 
enforcement, and inspection mechanisms.117 
One example of an RFMO is the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (“CCAMLR”).118 The CCAMLR’s twenty-
five members, including the United States, work to prevent IUU fishing in the 
Antarctic region.119 Like the various UN agreements, the CCAMLR employs 
measures to collect data on vessels and species, but adds a degree of specificity 
not contained in the broader UN agreements.120 For example, one CCAMLR 
initiative targets the Dissostichus species.121 It creates a catch documentation 
scheme for that species, requiring all parties to “cooperat[e] with CCAMLR 
. . . to identify the origin of Dissostichus spp. landed in, imported into, or ex-
ported” into member ports to help ensure adherence with the CCAMLR con-
servation measures.122 Moreover, the CCAMLR requires all parties to inspect 
every ship carrying the species to ensure compliance with CCAMLR man-
dates.123 Finally, it requires signatories to inspect at least half of the ships that 
come to their ports with any species.124 The CCAMLR is one of many RFMOs 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See PSMA, supra note 4, at 6; Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 32, at 100; 1993 FAO 
Compliance Agreement, supra note 89, at 125; UNCLOS, supra note 32, at 442; IPOA, supra note 13, 
at 9, 20. 
 116 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 6. 
 117 Id.; see PSMA, supra note 4, at v, vii–viii, 1–2, 9, 12–14, 16; Fish Stocks Agreement, supra 
note 32, at 88, 100, 103; 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, supra note 89, at 120, 124; UNCLOS, 
supra note 32, at 421; IPOA, supra note 13, at 4–5, 9. 
 118 See Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.
gov/e/oes/ocns/fish/regionalorganizations/ [https://perma.cc/VQF2-9CEZ] [hereinafter State RFMO 
Page]. 
 119 Comm’n for the Conversation of Antarctic Marine Living Res., About CCAMLR, 
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/about-ccamlr [https://perma.cc/LU3J-5ZME]; State RFMO 
Page, supra note 118. 
 120 Compare PSMA, supra note 32, at 28–29 (outlining standards designed to combat IUU fish-
ing), Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 32, at 103 (same), and 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement 
(same), supra note 89, at 124, with CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme, supra note 32 (high-
lighting the CCAMLR’s focus on specific fish species). 
 121 CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme, supra note 32. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Comm’n for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Res., Conservation Measure 10-03, 
Port Inspections of Fishing Vessels Carrying Antarctic Marine Living Resources (2015) [hereinafter 
CCAMLR Port Inspections Scheme]. 
 124 Id. 
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enforcing targeted policies in line with the UN agreements that play a key role 
in combatting IUU fishing.125 
3. EU Efforts to Combat IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud 
Various EU measures combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud.126 Three par-
ticularly relevant regulations are the Council Regulation 1005/2008 of 29 Sep-
tember 2008 establishing a Community System to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (“2008 Council Regulation”); 
Council Regulation 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 Establishing a Community 
Control System For Ensuring Compliance with the Rule of the Common Fisher 
Policy (“2009 Council Regulation”); and Regulation 1379/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Organiza-
tion of the Markets in Fishery and Aquaculture Products (“2013 Council Regula-
tion”).127 These regulations acknowledge the EU’s treaty obligations and lay out 
specific steps to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud.128 
The EU regulations take specific steps to collect information and track 
seafood through the supply chain.129 They also provide for inspection and en-
forcement mechanisms to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud.130 For exam-
ple, Article 51 of the 2008 Council Regulation calls for a “mutual assistance 
program,” with a data collection system that supports efforts to combat IUU 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See, e.g., General Info, NW. ATLANTIC FISHERIES ORG., https://www.nafo.int/About-us 
[https://perma.cc/LT6D-4R99] [hereinafter NAFO About Us]. For example, the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (“NAFO”) requires its twelve signatories to ensure vessels “transmit electroni-
cally . . . [the] quantity of catch on board by species upon entry into [its] regulatory area” and to en-
sure sellers label packages from its fishing areas with “only one product . . . [and] one species.” See 
NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures, at 45–46; NAFO About Us, supra. 
 126 See generally Council Regulation 1379/2013, supra note 32 (establishing a program to create, 
implement, and enforce common marketing standards, reporting requirements and enforcement mech-
anisms); Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89 (calling for coordination between various EU 
companies to promote compliance with fisheries policies); Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 
89 (calling on the European Community to “substantially enhance against IUU fishing”). 
 127 See Council Regulation 1379/2013, supra note 32, at 1; Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra 
note 89, at 1; Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 1. 
 128 See Council Regulation 1379/2013, supra note 32, at 1; Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra 
note 89, at 1; Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 1. For example, the 2008 Regulation 
states the EU is a signatory to the UNCLOS, UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and FAO Compliance 
Agreement, which call on signatories to develop schemes to protect the marine environment and to 
work together to accomplish this goal. Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 1. The regula-
tion further states “in line with its international commitments, . . . the Community should substantially 
enhance its action against IUU fishing and adopt new regulatory measures designed to cover all facets 
of the phenomenon.” Id. Finally, the 2008 Regulation directly endorses the IPOA. Id. 
 129 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1379/2013, supra note 32 (establishing a program to create, 
implement, and enforce common marketing standards, reporting requirements and enforcement mech-
anisms). 
 130 Id. at 5–6; Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 43; Council Regulation 
1005/2008, supra note 89, at 7, 9, 14–23, 25. 
1646 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1629 
fishing.131 In addition, the 2008 Council Regulation calls for a catch certifica-
tion mechanism that ensures any seafood entering a market was caught in a 
manner consistent with relevant regulations.132 Specifically, the scheme re-
quires each certificate to include the vessel’s name, description of product, 
species, weight, declarations of transshipment at sea, and authority to fish from 
the nation of the flag flown by the vessel.133 
These information collection and tracking requirements compliment the 
demands set forth in the 2013 Council Regulation.134 The 2013 Council Regu-
lation established concrete standards and systems to combat IUU fishing and 
seafood fraud.135 For example, the 2013 Council Regulation created organiza-
tions of individuals in the seafood industry with the authority to enact various 
catch identification and certification measures.136 It also established “common 
marketing standards,” which streamlined marketing practices related to the 
“size, weight, packing, presentation or labeling of products.”137 Finally, the 
2013 Council Regulation requires that seafood products sold in the EU have 
labels with the common and scientific name of the species, the way it was cap-
tured or farmed, where it was captured or farmed, and whether it underwent 
certain processing procedures like defrosting.138 Importantly, the 2013 Council 
Regulation says these standards apply to both the 2008 and 2009 Council Reg-
ulations, and require that any seafood sold in the EU be compliant with the 
relevant standards.139 
In addition to these data collection and tracking measures, the EU pro-
vides specific criteria and power for inspection and enforcement.140 For exam-
ple, the 2008 Council Regulation required inspection of at least five percent of 
landing and transshipment operations by non-EU vessels, and required inspec-
tion of all vessels found engaged in IUU fishing.141 Adding to these efforts, the 
2009 Council Regulation charged the Community Fisheries Control Agency to 
help create a scheme within the Common Fisheries Program of uniform stand-
                                                                                                                           
 131 See Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 25. 
 132 Id. at 10. 
 133 Id. at 27. 
 134 See Council Regulation 1379/2013, supra note 32, at 12; Council Regulation 1005/2008, su-
pra note 89, at 27. 
 135 Council Regulation 1379/2013, supra note 32, at 3–6, 10–12. 
 136 Id. at 4–5. The 2013 Council Regulation defines a “producer” as “any natural or legal person 
using means of production to obtain fishery or aquaculture products with a view to placing them on 
the market.” Id. at 4. 
 137 Id. at 11. 
 138 Id. at 12. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 43; Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra 
note 89, at 22, 27. 
 141 Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 7, 9. 
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ards for inspection and control programs targeting IUU fishing.142 Moreover, it 
required the Community Fisheries Control Agency to support the EU in creat-
ing a training program for fisheries inspectors.143 In combination with UN trea-
ties like the PSMA, these measures allow EU member states to successfully 
identify IUU fishing and seafood fraud and take appropriate action.144 
4. U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud 
a. The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
(“MSA”) is the key piece of U.S. legislation addressing fishing in federal wa-
ters. The MSA aims to prevent overfishing and provide safe seafood to con-
sumers.145 In order to accomplish these aims, the MSA creates eight regional 
fishery management councils comprised of public and private entities with an 
interest in the fisheries industry.146 The MSA requires these councils to create 
and implement “fishery management plans” that collect relevant data such as the 
type and quantity of species caught, as well as where and when the species was 
caught.147 
The MSA also takes specific steps to improve identification, tracking, and 
consequences for IUU fishing.148 For example, it calls for a comprehensive reg-
istration and data management system to track vessels and their fishing practic-
es.149 It also creates enforcement mechanisms that identify, label, and track those 
engaged in IUU fishing practices.150 In conjunction with these mechanisms, the 
MSA requires a biennial report to Congress regarding worldwide compliance 
with various requirements.151 That biennial report contains a list of countries 
engaged in IUU fishing and any enforcement measures applied to those coun-
                                                                                                                           
 142 Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 43. The Common Fisheries Policy is a Euro-
pean Union “framework and set of regulations for common fisheries policy.” See Council Regulation 
1379/2013, supra note 32, at 1; Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 1; The Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP), EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp_en [https://perma.cc/3MLE-
GFN7] (last updated Oct. 16, 2017). 
 143 Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 43. 
 144 See Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 9; PSMA, supra note 4, at 9–10, 12; 
DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57; Conathan & Siciliano, supra note 57. 
 145 Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), U.S. REGIONAL FISHERY MGMT. COUNCILS, http://www.
fisherycouncils.org/about-the-msa/ [https://perma.cc/6Q65-Z6ZU]; Magnuson-Stevens Fisher Con-
servation and Management Act, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/laws_policies/msa/ 
[https://perma.cc/CFP2-K49H] [hereinafter NOAA Fisheries Website]. 
 146 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5) (2012); NOAA Fisheries Website, supra note 145. 
 147 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(5). 
 148 Id. § 1826h. 
 149 Id. § 1881(a)–(c). 
 150 Id. § 1826j(a)–(b). 
 151 Id. § 1826h. 
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tries.152 Finally, the MSA recognizes the need for international cooperation to 
tackle IUU fishing and to prevent fishing methods that negatively impact ocean-
ic resources and harm the U.S. seafood industry.153 
b. The Presidential Task Force’s Action Plan 
Expanding upon the MSA, the most recent effort by the United States to 
combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud is the Presidential Task Force’s Action 
Plan.154 As the first major effort to explicitly name and target seafood fraud, the 
Action Plan targets IUU fishing and seafood fraud in four primary ways.155 
Broadly, it calls for international efforts targeting IUU fishing and seafood fraud, 
improved enforcement mechanisms, coordination with non-governmental actors, 
and the proliferation of traceability requirements.156 More specifically, the Ac-
tion Plan calls for ratification of the PSMA and alignment of best practices in the 
international community, such as catch documentation and inspection.157 Addi-
tionally, in line with recent UN, RFMO, and EU efforts, the Action Plan calls for 
the promulgation of regulations to create a “seafood traceability program” that 
improves collection and analysis of relevant data on IUU fishing and seafood 
fraud and allows for sharing among entities responsible for regulation and en-
forcement.158 In particular, one recommendation calls for a program to track 
species most affected by IUU fishing and seafood fraud from where they are 
captured to their entry into the United States.159 It also provides that these efforts 
should eventually track all species—not just those particularly affected by IUU 
fishing and seafood fraud.160 
The final regulation resulting from the Action Plan’s recommendation cre-
ates a traceability scheme that requires collection of data on imported seafood 
when it enters the United States, and mandates recordkeeping for seafood prod-
ucts as they enter U.S. markets.161 The regulation targets thirteen species with 
the intention that data collected prevents access to U.S. markets for seafood that 
is mislabeled or the product of IUU fishing.162 Specifically, the regulation re-
quires that all parties importing seafood to the United States provide a identify-
                                                                                                                           
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. § 1801(a)(12) 
 154 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 3, 5, 7. 
 155 Id. at 3. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 10–13. The United States has since ratified the PSMA and the Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015 implements its provisions domestically. Pub. L. No. 114–
81, § 302, 129 Stat. at 664; Conathan & Siciliano, supra note 57. 
 158 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 36. 
 159 Id. at 36–37. 
 160 Id. 
 161 50 C.F.R. § 300.324. 
 162 Id. § 300.324(a)(2)–(3). 
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ing information about the vessel.163 In addition, the regulation requires a variety 
of data on the seafood itself, including the name of species and the amount of the 
species caught by weight or quantity.164 Finally, it requires data on the timing 
and location of a vessel’s fishing activity, as well as data regarding any previous 
transshipments or entries to other ports with the fish on board.165 The traceability 
system promulgated in this regulation holds promise for eventually minimizing 
IUU fishing and seafood fraud.166 
III. RECENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT IUU AND SEAFOOD ARE A GOOD START, 
BUT MORE WORK IS NEEDED 
Recent efforts to curb IUU fishing and seafood fraud demonstrate positive 
momentum toward combatting the issue.167 Nonetheless, work remains to be 
done.168 The Presidential Task Force’s recent Action Plan suffers from important 
shortcomings.169 Most notably, the provisions of the traceability program and the 
port state measures recommendations fail the Presidential Task Force’s own call 
for adoption of best practices and an internationally integrated approach.170 To 
correct these shortcomings, the United States and EU should enter into a bilat-
eral agreement that standardizes all aspects of their traceability systems, port 
state measures, and accompanying enforcement mechanisms.171 
                                                                                                                           
 163 Id. § 300.324(b)(1). 
 164 Id. § 300.324(b)(2). 
 165 Id. § 300.324(b)(3). 
 166 See WARNER, supra note 15, at 18 (arguing that the traceability rule presents a “historic” 
chance to effectively track seafood sold in the United States). 
 167 Id. at 2; Teletsky, supra note 62, at 1251–52; Conathan & Siciliano, supra note 57. 
 168 See WARNER, supra note 15, at 2, 18 (highlighting the rule’s failure to require labels with 
species specific names); Dan Flynn, NOAA Plans Traceability Regs for Seafood Importers, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/02/traceability-program-for-
seafood-importers-announced-by-noaa/#.WKooTU0zWUk [https://perma.cc/J7VG-WBXU] (arguing 
that the new traceability rule needs to extend past the point of entry to the domestic market); Patrick 
Mustain & Avery Siciliano, Fish Stories: Success and Value in Seafood Traceability, OCEANA 18 
(Mar. 2016) (finding that the United States needs to establish a scheme for full traceability as opposed 
to a scheme that only tracks seafood upon entry to the United States). 
 169 IPOA, supra note 13, at 2 (implying the need for international solutions); Leal et al., supra 
note 7, at 334 (finding that implementation of various IUU fishing regulations has been insufficient); 
Young, supra note 1, at 215 (arguing for a more widespread and coordinated approach to combat IUU 
fishing). 
 170 See 50 C.F.R. §§ 300.323–.325; PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 10, 12, 36. 
 171 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 10–13; Young, supra note 1, at 215–16 
(finding that a shortcoming of previous efforts to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud was their 
unilateral nature, and arguing for a more integrated effort). 
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A. Traceability and Port State Measures Are the Most Effective Ways to 
Combat IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud 
IUU fishing and seafood fraud require multifaceted solutions.172 The vari-
ous strategies to combat the issues include the following: extending efforts to 
encompass domestic and private entities, enhancing coordination between do-
mestic actors, relying on RFMOs, implementing various trade measures, im-
proving labeling practices, increasing resources and inspections, and providing 
support to developing nations.173 These strategies are widely employed, includ-
ing in the Presidential Task Force’s Action Plan, and should continue.174 Never-
theless, the United States should narrow its focus to traceability programs and 
port state measures.175 
Traceability is essential to combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud for 
three primary reasons.176 First, it is a prerequisite to any labeling, tracking, and 
enforcement measures as it collects the data necessary to identify products of 
IUU fishing and seafood fraud.177 Second, it directly combats the difficulties 
posed by the international nature of the seafood trade by tracking seafood across 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Cawthorn et al., supra note 9, at 180 (finding efforts to combat IUU fishing and seafood 
fraud will be insignificant without proper enforcement and sufficient penalties); Leal et al., supra note 
7, at 332 (arguing for a coordinated approach); Young, supra note 1, at 215 (same). 
 173 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 12, 18, 20, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34 (calling for the 
use of RFMOs, trade measures, increased resources, an integrated approach between relevant domestic 
actors, improved naming and labeling practices, and improved enforcement measures); IPOA, supra note 
13, at 23 (calling for countries to assist developing nations); Young, supra note 1, at 212 (calling for the 
use of trade measures); WARNER, supra note 15, at 3, 18 (calling for stronger domestic measures and 
labeling practices); Mustain & Siciliano, supra note 168, at 18 (calling for better labeling practices). 
 174 See WARNER, supra note 15, at 2 (praising the Presidential Task Force’s efforts as a good first 
step toward preventing IUU fishing and seafood fraud); Conathan & Siciliano, supra note 57 (same). 
 175 See Cawthorn et al., supra note 9, at 180 (linking continuing seafood fraud to ineffective 
traceability schemes); Leal et al., supra note 7, at 333 (arguing that enforcement entities do not have 
effective tools to track seafood and inform consumers); Teletsky, supra note 62, at 1270 (arguing that 
efforts to stop IUU fishing will rely on effective traceability of seafood and port state measures). 
Young also suggests that in addition to traceability and port state measures, “states will need to en-
gage with affected trading partners and also affected communities, such as indigenous peoples or 
small-scale fishers, to ensure an approach that meets its objectives, and to ensure that the measures 
improve the legality of catch rather than simply diverting illegal catch to other markets.” Young, su-
pra note 1, at 215. 
 176 See Cawthorn et al., supra note 9, at 180 (linking continuing seafood fraud to ineffective 
traceability schemes); Leal et al., supra note 9, at 331 (finding that traceability is vital to ensuring 
compliance with various regulations); Young, supra note 1, at 209 (arguing that traceability is particu-
larly important because of the international nature of the seafood industry); Teletsky, supra note 62, at 
1262 (highlighting the importance of tracing seafood from the ocean to the final point of sale). 
 177 See WARNER, supra note 15, at 2 (highlighting various benefits of “full-chain traceability”); 
Young, supra note 1, at 212 (finding various measures rely on identification and traceability of sea-
food species); Teletsky, supra note 62, at 1265 (finding traceability is an initial requirement for identi-
fying seafood sourced by illegal means); Mustain & Siciliano, supra note 168, at 1, 17 (arguing trace-
ability is an initial requirement for identifying seafood sourced by illegal means and would make 
perpetrators more accountable). 
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jurisdictions.178 Third, it meets consumer demands to know where seafood 
comes from and allows for the sale of higher quality product at an increased 
price.179 
While traceability is key to combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud, ef-
fective port state measures are also critically important.180 First, traceability 
measures are useless without appropriate port state measures to prevent products 
of IUU fishing and seafood fraud from reaching markets.181 Second, as the ma-
jority of products of IUU fishing and seafood fraud are imported, effective port 
state measures prevent such products from crossing international borders.182 The 
combination of a robust traceability program and effective port state measures is 
key to combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud, and chances of success with 
these methods are greatly increased if they are integrated across borders.183 
B. Coordination of Traceability and Port State Measures Between the EU 
and United States Is Key to Combatting IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud 
Given the international and complicated nature of the seafood business, 
cohesion between nations’ traceability programs and port state measures is key 
to combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud.184 More specifically, coordina-
                                                                                                                           
 178 See GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1 (finding that the majority of U.S. seafood is imported); 
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 7 (finding that domestic fisheries are less of a problem 
than international fisheries); Young, supra note 1, at 209 (finding that market-related measures to 
combat IUU fishing are particularly important for combatting the IUU fishing that occurs in various 
jurisdictions). This is particularly important because seafood fraud is less pronounced in the domestic 
market, and efforts to combat seafood fraud should accordingly be focused on the international mar-
ket. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 7 (finding that domestic fisheries are less of a 
problem than international fisheries); Wagner, supra note 2, at 111; Lou, supra note 1 (finding that 
domestic actors typically adhere to labeling rules). 
 179 See Cawthorn et al., supra note 9, at 165 (finding that consumers are increasingly demanding 
more information about the seafood they consume); Leal et al., supra note 7, at 331–32 (finding that 
the international nature of the market and increased food safety concerns have led consumers to desire 
traceability); Mustain & Siciliano, supra note 168, at 15, 18 (finding that traceability can satisfy de-
mands for authenticity and quality, thus increasing price). 
 180 See Teletsky, supra note 62, at 1270 (arguing that efforts to stop IUU fishing will rely on 
effective traceability of seafood and port state measures). 
 181 See id. at 1265 (finding that required traceability is an initial requirement for identifying ille-
gally caught seafood). Teletsky also finds that “without a reasonable ability to sanction flag states 
through trade measures, there will be minimal interruption in the current IUU fishing chain.” Id. at 
1238, 1243–44. 
 182 See PSMA, supra note 4, at vii (finding that port state measures are effective in inhibiting IUU 
fishing); Abelson & Daley, supra note 3 (linking increases in seafood fraud to the international nature 
of the trade); Lou, supra note 1 (finding international actors are largely to blame for seafood fraud). 
 183 See Leal et al., supra note 7, at 332 (arguing for a coordinated approach); Teletsky, supra note 
62, 1251–52, 1270 (arguing efforts to stop IUU fishing will rely on effective traceability of seafood 
and port state measures). 
 184 See Leal et al., supra note 7, at 332 (arguing for an integrated approach); Teletsky, supra note 
62, at 1262 (finding that because port state measures need to be consistent, it is vital that nations have 
a coordinated traceability scheme); Young, supra note 1, at 216 (calling for coordination of traceabil-
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tion of U.S. and EU traceability programs and port state measures would play a 
vital role in combatting the practices.185 U.S. and EU coordination is critical 
because, as the two largest seafood markets in the world, other countries would 
follow suit in order to maintain access to those lucrative markets.186 
C. EU and U.S. Traceability Programs and Port State  
Measures Differ in Important Ways 
U.S. and EU traceability programs and port state measures have some over-
lap, but differ in important ways.187 For example, while the U.S. traceability 
regulation targets thirteen particular species, the EU regulations seek “full 
traceability” of all species.188 In addition, the U.S. traceability regulation only 
traces products to the point of importation.189 In contrast, the EU regulations 
provide for specific labeling and certification to track fish all the way to the 
end consumer.190 
                                                                                                                           
ity requirements). This is especially important in the United States because seafood fraud is much less 
pronounced in the domestic market, and the majority of seafood fraud in the United States occurs with 
approximately ninety percent of imported product. GAO-09-258, supra note 2, at 1; PRESIDENTIAL 
TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 7; DUNCAN, supra note 1, at 57. 
 185 See Young, supra note 1, at 215 (finding market-related measures are more effective when 
nations act in unison); Teletsky, supra note 62, at 1262; Conathan & Siciliano, supra note 57 (finding 
a coordinated U.S. and EU approach would engender positive change in the industry). 
 186 See LOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (finding that other nations would likely adopt a com-
mon U.S.-EU standard for naming and labeling species); Teletsky, supra note 62, at 1263 (finding that 
other nations would likely adopt a common U.S.-EU reporting standard because of the collective size 
of their markets); Conathan & Siciliano, supra note 57 (finding that the collective size of the U.S. and 
EU market would drive other nations to adopt a common policy); Combating Illegal Fishing and 
Strengthening Seafood Traceability, FAO REGIONAL OFF. FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Mar. 22, 2016), 
http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/news/detail–events/en/c/396002/ [https://perma.cc/BB6H-KG6P] (dis-
cussing reliance on EU and U.S. markets and the manner in which EU and U.S. requirements effect those 
wishing to import seafood into those markets). 
 187 See Leal et al., supra note 7, at 332 (finding the EU traceability scheme superior to other large 
markets); Bruno G. Simões & Tobias Dolle, The Global Combat Against IUU Fishing: The United States 
Proposes a New Seafood Traceability Program, 7 EUR. J. RISK REG. 421, 422 (2016) (finding the EU’s 
catch certification scheme an outlier from other traceability efforts). Compare Council Regulation 
1224/2009, supra note 89, at 4 (establishing concrete traceability requirements), and Council Regula-
tion 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 10, 27 (same), with Magnuson-Steven Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act; Seafood Import Monitoring Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,975, 88,982 (Dec. 9, 2016) 
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 300, 600) [hereinafter Seafood Import Monitoring Program] (finding 
that there are important differences between EU and U.S. traceability programs). 
 188 See Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 4, 24; 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)–(3); 
Young, supra note 1, at 210. Specifically, Article 58 of Council Regulation 1224/2009 provides “all 
lots of fisheries and aquaculture products shall be traceable at all stages of production, processing and 
distribution, from catching or harvesting to retail stage.” Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra, at 24. 
In contrast, the regulation specifies that only “the following species or species groups are subject to 
this Seafood Traceability Program . . . .” 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)–(3). 
 189 See 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)–(e); PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 36. 
 190 See Council Regulation 1379/2013, supra note 32, at 11 (calling for “common marketing 
standards” that use information collected due to the traceability requirements to label seafood); Coun-
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Similarly, the United States and EU have areas of overlap and difference 
in regard to their port state measures.191 Both the United States and EU are 
parties to the PSMA.192 Therefore, the United States and EU must inspect ves-
sels coming into their ports, share results of those inspections, deny access to 
their ports for vessels engaged in IUU fishing, and notify other nations and 
RFMOs of that denial.193 In addition, both parties employ a system to identify 
and punish perpetrators of IUU fishing and seafood fraud.194 Both the United 
States and EU seem to hold back from fully enforcing these measures, and of-
ten warn nations engaged in IUU fishing instead of barring them from entry.195 
There are also important differences between the EU and U.S. approach 
to IUU fishing and seafood fraud.196 First, their efforts to identify and punish 
perpetrators of IUU fishing are separate, and thus their lists of nations are dif-
ferent.197 In addition, because the PSMA does not require specific inspection 
                                                                                                                           
cil Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 89, at 24 (providing for traceability “from catching or harvesting 
to retail stage”) (emphasis added); 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)–(e). 
 191 See Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 9 (calling for mandatory inspection of 
5% of vessels); 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(d) (stating vessels “may be selected for inspection”); PSMA, 
supra note 4, at 9–10, 12 (binding signatories to shared efforts on port state measures); Blue Growth 
Blog: Port State Measures Agreement Enters Into Force as International Treaty, FOOD & AGRIC. 
ORG. OF THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/blogs/blue–growth–blog/port–state–measures–agreement–
enters–into–force–as–international–treaty/en/ [https://perma.cc/Q8D4-9QXV]. 
 192 Pub. L. No. 114–81, 129 Stat. at 664 (implementing legislation for the PSMA); Press Release, 
European Commission, Statement by Commissioner Vella Welcoming New Global Agreement to 
Fight Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (June 3, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-16-2022_en.htm [https://perma.cc/CP2X-9QNQ]. 
 193 PSMA, supra note 4, at 9–10, 12. Specifically, Article 11 provides that “a Party shall deny . . . 
[a] vessel the use of the port for landing, transshipping, packaging and processing of fish . . . [if] the 
Party has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was otherwise engaged in IUU fishing or fish-
ing related activities in support of such fishing.” Id. at 9. Article 11 then provides “where a Party has 
denied the use of its port in accordance with this Article, it shall promptly notify the flag State and, as 
appropriate, relevant coastal States, regional fisheries management organizations and other relevant 
international organizations of its decision.” Id. at 10. Furthermore, Article 12 provides “Each Party 
shall inspect the number of vessels in its ports required to reach an annual level of inspections suffi-
cient to achieve the objective of this Agreement.” Id. Finally, Article 15 provides “each Party shall 
transmit the results of each inspection to the flag State of the inspected vessel.” Id. at 12. 
 194 See 16 U.S.C. § 1826h (2012 & Supp. IV 2016); Council Regulation 1224/2009, supra note 
89, at 43; Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 22, 27; Young, supra note 1, at 211. 
 195 See Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwreck, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1385, 1420–21 
(2016) (finding that the threat of various international sanctions prevents the EU from blocking port 
access for vessels from specific nations); Young, supra note 1, at 209, 211 (finding the efficacy of U.S. 
trade sanctions and its willingness to use them is questionable because nations named in the initial 2013 
list of countries violating IUU fishing requirements reappeared on the 2015 list without additional conse-
quence). 
 196 See PSMA, supra note 4, at 10–12; Council Regulation 1005/2008, supra note 89, at 9; 50 
C.F.R. § 300.324(d); Young, supra note 1, at 209, 211. 
 197 See NOAA 2015 REPORT, supra note 49, at 23–29; Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin, 
Report to Congress on Improving International Fisheries Management 18–32 (Jan. 2013); Young, 
supra note 1, at 209, 211. In the 2013 and 2015 reports mandated by the MSA, the states listed as 
having vessels engaged in IUU fishing were Colombia, Ecuador, Ghana, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Nica-
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targets, the U.S. and EU inspection schemes differ, with more specific re-
quirements in the EU.198 
If the United States is going to solve the issues of IUU fishing and sea-
food fraud with a traceability program and port state measures, an international 
approach is needed.199 While coordination between many nations would be 
very difficult to accomplish, direct coordination with the EU has particular 
promise.200 For that approach to work, efforts need to address the mismatch 
between U.S. and EU policies.201 
D. A Bilateral Instrument Between the United States and EU Would Make a 
Significant Stride in Combatting IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud 
While there is little doubt that an international, multilateral approach is 
needed, the United States should focus its attention on collaborating with the EU 
to implement a bilateral agreement.202 That bilateral agreement should incorpo-
rate three goals: a single traceability system, specific standards for the various 
mandates of the PSMA, and the specific delineation of eliminating seafood fraud 
as a goal of the agreement.203 
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First, the United States and EU should create one traceability program that 
mirrors the current EU requirements.204 The system should seek “full traceabil-
ity,” meaning the scheme would track seafood from where it was caught to the 
final point of sale and require specific labeling standards.205 The EU require-
ments show quantifiable signs of success, suggesting the method works.206 
Moreover, storage in one system would make it easier for the United States and 
EU to identify threatened species, addressing one of the environmental concerns 
of IUU fishing, and also identify vessels in violation of various rules.207 Finally, 
because this type of system has brought about successful results in the EU, this 
would accomplish the goal of Recommendation Two of the Presidential Task 
Force’s Action Plan to adopt best practices.208 
Second, the United States and EU should agree to specific standards for the 
various mandates of the PSMA.209 Unlike current measures, the United States 
and EU should begin by agreeing upon specific requirements for inspections.210 
This would ensure that all vessels know they are just as likely to be inspected in 
either market, and prevent them from choosing a market based on a lower likeli-
hood of inspection.211 Moreover, the United States and EU should agree to main-
tain a joint list of perpetrators of IUU fishing and seafood fraud.212 This would 
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solve the problem of “port hopping,” where vessels blocked from one nation’s 
ports simply utilize another.213 Furthermore, instead of issuing warnings to coun-
tries on that list, which have proven ineffective, the United States and EU should 
follow through with fully blocking access to port for countries engaged in IUU 
fishing practices.214 Given the combined size and value of the U.S. and EU mar-
kets, doing so for even a short period of time would likely lead to a change in 
practices.215 
Finally, unlike previous agreements, but like the Presidential Task Force’s 
Action Plan, an agreement between the United States and EU should name sea-
food fraud as a particular target of the agreement.216 This relatively simple effort 
may spark an awareness in consumers that leads to self-policing from vessels 
that have an economic incentive to meet consumer demands.217 In turn, this may 
lead private industry to impose its own requirements, eliminating the resource 
conundrum currently faced by governments.218 
A bilateral agreement between the United States and EU with these three 
goals has great potential to overcome the deficits of the Presidential Task Force’s 
Action Plan.219 The Presidential Task Force’s Action Plan hints at such a solution 
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in Recommendation Four, calling for negotiators of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership agreement between the United States and EU to target 
IUU fishing in particular, including port state measures.220 Those negotiations 
should certainly continue, but the Presidential Task Force should press for the 
specificity discussed in the three goals.221 That being said, the combination of 
clear efforts by the United States and EU to combat IUU fishing and seafood 
fraud, as well as bipartisan support on the issue within the United States, sug-
gests there is an opportunity to pursue a separate agreement.222 Recognizing the 
difficulty of securing a bilateral agreement, the United States and EU, at the very 
least, should work to coordinate policies in the aforementioned ways.223 The 
governments agreed to work together in the past, but need to coordinate on spe-
cific terms.224 Doing so may be the crucial step that increases the likelihood that 
the name on the menu matches the food on the plate.225 
CONCLUSION 
IUU fishing and seafood fraud threaten human health, the environment, and 
livelihoods. To date, the complexities of these problems inhibited the success of 
various multilateral, regional, domestic, and private efforts. Against that back-
ground, the Presidential Task Force’s Action Plan is a step in the right direction. 
The plan has the right ingredients, namely, numerous efforts that continue the 
worldwide trend toward traceability programs and port state measures. For these 
programs to work, however, they need further reach into the domestic market 
and cohesion with the rest of the world. 
The first step in this process should be the creation of a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and EU that standardizes traceability programs and 
port state measures. In addition, the United States and EU need to take a firm 
and collective stance against vessels and nations engaged in IUU fishing, follow-
ing through on threats to prevent their entry to market. In so doing, the U.S.’s 
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and EU’s collective value to the world seafood market will likely spark change. 
Importantly, this agreement should explicitly name seafood fraud as the problem. 
Stories of seafood fraud and subsequent efforts for change suggest that citizens 
demand action when they believe their wallets or their health are on the line. In 
combination, this recipe would be a great leap toward ensuring that when it 
comes to seafood, we get what we order. 
THOMAS LAMPERT 
